This paper presents an analysis of the quality of VAT administration in OECD countries and Russia. Econometric analysis of the factors which influence the quality of VAT administration, demonstrate a positive effect of the level of institutional development on the efficiency of tax collection. However this tendency takes place only when there are no additional tax exemptions being implemented alongside the economic development where exemptions, in addition to causing a direct loss, complicate the taxation system and lower the quality of its administration.
Introduction
Reform of value-added tax (VAT) has been continuously discussed in Russia in recent years.
Amongst the proposed options for VAT reform the most frequently discussed issues are: significant reduction of the tax rate, replacing VAT with a sales tax and the transition to VAT collection on the basis of a balance method. Arguments supporting the need for reform of the VAT system commonly include the known difficulties relating to VAT administration, which reduce its efficiency not only in Russia but also in other countries. These are: problems with VAT refunds and the justifications for tax deductions, use of various illegal tax minimization schemes, illegal tax refunds from the budget in the case of 'false exports', high administration costs and the possibilities of evading import VAT.
Where obvious problems exist with VAT administration we should not forget that this tax raises a substantial part of the budget revenues (5.3% of Russian GDP in 2009). VAT, being less susceptible to fluctuations in the world prices for oil and energy resources than income tax, mineral extraction tax and the unified social tax which existed until 2010 1 , is able to ensure the stability of the entire system of state finances in the long run. This is why any steps for tax reform should be thoroughly analyzed from the point of view of the potential benefits and costs.
VAT in the budget systems of OECD countries and Russia
For the last 50 years the scope of VAT application has grown considerably as part of the system of consumption taxes and has almost entirely replaced sales tax. Whilst in 1965 VAT was introduced in only three OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries, today it is applied by 29 out of the 30 OECD countries (with the exception of the USA). Along with the increase in the share of budget revenues of OECD countries raised by VAT 2 , almost all these countries have faced complications in the VAT administration system, mainly through the use of tax preferences which, in turn, has led to a loss of part of the tax revenues and an increase in administration costs and VAT collection risks.
1 See (Kazakova et al., 2009) . 2 See the OECD website http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx.
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At the moment VAT represents a major part of the tax revenues in 136 countries and accounts for about 25% of global tax levies 3 . There is active discussion on the influence on welfare of the transition from foreign trade taxes to VAT 4 . All other conditions being equal, economic administration costs are less for VAT (due to the wider tax base) than for other taxes. Even if increasing the tax rate does not lead to an increase of tax revenues 5 , for developing and transitional economies it is one of the most reliable ways to increase state budget revenues.
In countries with a high VAT tax burden, for example, Denmark and Sweden, where the basic rate is set at 25%, the average tax revenues for the period 2000-2007 were about 9.8% and 8.9% of GDP (respectively), i.e. each percentage point (p.p.) of the tax rate ensured 0.36-0.39% of GDP. In the leading countries of the European economy the level of the basic rate is close to that in Russia (16-20%) . For example, in Germany where the rate is 16% average tax revenues were 6.5% of GDP, in Great Britain where the rate is 20% revenues were 6.8%, in France where the rate is 19.6% -7.2% of GDP, in Austria where the rate is 20% -8.0% of GDP. The above data show an almost equivalent value of revenues for each percentage point of the rate equal to 0.36-0.40% of GDP (as in the Scandinavian countries).
In Table 1 ). 3 See detailed description in (Ebrill et al., 2001) . 4 In the paper (Emran, Stiglitz, 2005) the authors came to the conclusion that benefits from a transition to VAT are quite doubtful if the share of the shadow economy is relatively high. In (Baunsgaard, Keen, 2005) it is shown that in developing countries the benefit from transition to VAT in the case of the liberalization of foreign trade is just 50 cents per dollar lost due to the reduction of customs duties and in underdeveloped countries the benefit is even more insignificant. 5 For example, we could compare the effects of the tax rate increase in Mexico (Pagan et al., 2001 ) with effects of the less successful tax rate increase in Jamaica (Edmiston, Bird, 2004) .
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The structure of VAT revenues in the 2000s shows a considerable reduction in the proportion of VAT for internal sales from 77.8% in 2000 to 57.3% in 2009 with a simultaneous increase in proceeds from the tax levied on imported goods. The reduction of budget revenues from the VAT may, in many respects, be explained by changes in legislation. The most important innovations in tax law relate to the second half of the 2000s and may be arbitrarily divided into two groups:
 changes affecting the level of the tax burden on an ongoing basis. The most significant changes in this group are: the reduction of the base rate of VAT from 20% to 18%, the transition to mandatory determination of the date when the obligation to pay VAT on an accrual basis arises for all taxpayers and the abolition of tax exemptions;
 changes which generally have a temporary effect on the level of tax revenues: the establishment of a common procedure for the acceptance of the VAT amounts for deduction in the case of capital investments, the transition to a quarterly period for internal VAT payments, etc.
An assessment of the effects of the most important legislative changes on VAT revenues is shown in Table 2 . Source: calculations carried out by the authors based on tax statistics, while explanatory notes on the projects of the federal budget and the assessment of lost revenues are according to data from the Federal Tax Service.
3. Approaches to assessing the quality of VAT administration A basic theoretical model for the quality of VAT administration has been proposed (Cukierman et al., 1992) and further developed (Aizenman, Jinjarak, 2005) . These authors showed that the efficiency of the tax system depends directly on the stability of the political system and differences in the existing policy for the selection of public goods. This model predicts a high quality of tax administration in economic systems with a high level of institutional development.
The efficiency of VAT is influenced by many factors which not only vary greatly between countries but are also assessed statistically in different ways in individual countries. Therefore, the problem of obtaining comparable and reliable statistical information is one of the main reasons why there have been so few cross-country empirical studies devoted to the analysis of the quality of VAT administration.
Underlying all the empirical studies set out below is the indicator for the assessment of VAT administration quality: in some papers it is called the effective tax base, in others -the Сi-efficiency, or VAT efficiency. Despite discrepancies in the terminology used and minor differences in the calculations it is essentially the same indicator (hereinafter we use both of the two synonyms: effective tax base and Ciefficiency, to characterize the quality of VAT administration), which can be interpreted in two ways.
1) The Сi-efficiency is equal to VAT returns VAT rate X (final consumption), shows the proportion of the base which is taxed effectively.
2) The Ci-efficiency shows the amount of VAT revenue as a proportion of the base which accounts for 1 percentage point on the basic tax rate.
If we use data from tax returns as a nominal tax base in calculating Ci-efficiency, the effective base will be different from the nominal base only because of the structure of the VAT rates and exemptions. In order to take into account the administration efficiency in the Ci-efficiency, including that involved in combating tax evasion, we must use an indicator representing the true tax base, i.e. the base which includes the part not declared in tax returns and therefore related to tax evasion. As such, we use the final consumption, assuming that it represents an estimate of the true value of the VAT base.
The use of Ci-efficiency for the comparison of the quality of VAT administration is justified only in the case of countries with equivalent tax bases and rate structures. Therefore, for cross-country analysis it is necessary to control the Ci-efficiency using variables that determine these characteristics. Since comparable data for the determination of tax bases may not always be available, in interpreting results, one should take into account that the Ci-efficiency reflects more than just the administration efficiency.
7
Based on a sample from 40 to 89 countries, a group of researchers from the IMF 6 obtained the following results. Firstly, VAT Ci-efficiency decreases as the basic rate increases, which may be explained by an increase in the number of exemptions and preferential rates applied, a growth in the shadow economy, and other factors which complicate tax administration in the case of high rates. Secondly, the effective VAT base is higher in countries where external trade represents a greater proportion of their GDP, perhaps, due to the simplicity of collection of VAT on in imports compared to other goods subject to VAT. Thirdly, an effective VAT base is positively, although weakly, bound to the length of the VAT application period in the country which, perhaps, reflects the positive impact of the experience of fiscal authorities on tax revenues.
In a paper (Edmiston, Bird, 2004) , based on the results of a comparison of administration efficiency in a range of countries 7 , it was concluded that there is no direct interdependence between the effective tax base and the level of economic development. Thus, if the level of economic development itself does not explain the quality of VAT administration, the question arises as to which variables could be responsible. The paper (McCarten, 2005) shows that factors such as the openness of the economy, the literacy level of the population and the expenses relating to new business start-ups may explain about 40% of the Сi-efficiency dispersion. Moreover, by using a relatively small sample of transitional economies, the author showed that the level of corruption in the economy negatively affects the VAT efficiency.
An unbalanced panel of 44 countries for the period of 1970-1999 was used in (Aizenman, Jinjarak, 2005) for the identification of factors affecting the effective VAT base. It was found that VAT efficiency positively depends on the level of per capita GDP, the degree of urbanization, the openness of the economy and political stability. At the same time, a there was a negative relationship between the effective VAT base and the share of the agricultural sector in the economy.
In general, it should be noted that the main result of the empirical studies analyzed is the identification of fairly large variations between countries in the efficiency of VAT collection and this is due to a relatively large number of factors explaining both the quality of administration in the different economies and determining the tax base width and the base rate. 
Economic analysis of the quality of VAT administration
As an indicator of the efficiency of tax collection we also use the Ci-efficiency 8 , the values of which for individual countries are shown in figure 1. It is not hard to see that the distribution of countries in terms of their Ci-efficiency does not correspond to the distribution in terms of their level of economic development which, as was mentioned above, is explained by the existence of other factors affecting the quality of tax administration and cross-country differences in the tax bases and rates. The basic hypothesis of our study is that an improvement in the quality of institutions which, quite arbitrarily, may be characterized by the per capita GDP, will result in an increase of VAT collection efficiency. At the same time, it is necessary to take into account the effects of other variables which reflect differences in the structure of the tax bases and rates.
In the light of the above, the Ci-efficiency should be modeled with regard to national peculiarities in the tax base structure, the quantity and scope of the application of preferential rates, the size of the shadow sector, the quality of public institutions, etc. Below we set out the formulations of main the hypotheses (in bold) which are to be empirically verified, and a description of the indicators used in building the regression equations.
1) The level of institutional development determines the quality of tax administration; the more developed the institutions, the higher the Ci-efficiency. Although differences in the per capita GDP may not alone explain the difference in Ci-efficiency, this indicator (all other conditions being equal)
should be statistically significant. In order to verify the hypothesis we use a variable of per capita GDP at PPP (purchasing power parity) for 2005 prices (gdppc).
2) All other things being equal, the VAT rate (rate) should negatively affect the Ci-efficiency. Firstly, in practice a high base rate of VAT usually implies a narrower tax base because many goods are subject to VAT at a reduced rate or are exempt from VAT. Secondly, higher tax rates create more incentives for tax evasion (Yitzhaki, 1974; Sandmo, 1987; Aizenman, Jinjarak, 2005; McCarten, 2005) , which directly affects the efficiency of administration.
3) A positive interdependence between the import orientation of the economy and the Ciefficiency may be assumed (all other conditions being equal). Due to the simplicity of collecting VAT on imports, tax revenues should be higher for countries with a higher proportion of imports in their GDP in the final consumption. The ratio of total imports to final consumption is used as an indicator of an import-oriented economy (imp_cons).
4) The higher the share of the shadow economy and corruption, the greater the level of tax evasion and the lower the quality of VAT administration. To determine the size of the shadow economy is quite difficult. Schneider in his study (Schneider, 2005) presented data on the share of the shadow economy in the GDP for a range of countries for particular years; however, the paper is based on a limited number of observations. Below we use the index of corruption from the Heritage Foundation database. The index values vary from 0 to 100: the higher the index, the better is the performance of the anti-corruption institutions. A scatter diagram for the shadow economy index (the higher the index, the lower the share of the shadow economy in the GDP) and the corruption index is presented in figure 2.
The correlation between the corruption index and Schneider's data is 82%, so the use of this index allows us to characterize both the corruption level and the size of the shadow economy. 5) The period for which VAT has been applied (age) should positively affect the quality of administration due to the accumulation of working experience by the fiscal authorities and taxpayers. 6) In the financial sector a major proportion of the transactions is not subject to VAT, which implies a negative effect of the "share of financial assets in GDP" variable on tax revenues. At the same time the level of development of financial institutions should correlated with the level of development of other public institutions, including that of the institutions for tax administration. Our hypothesis is that, all other conditions being equal (with the remaining variables controlled) there should be a dominant positive effect of the financial sector on the administration quality. In order to characterize the financial sector in the GDP structure, the proportion of the assets of the banking sector in GDP (assets_share) is used 9 .
7) The proportion of agriculture in the GDP (agriculture) should negatively affect the level of the Ciefficiency. Firstly, in this sector, tax legislation usually provides many advantages (preferential rates and exemptions) while tax collection here is hampered due to the subsistence economy. Secondly, high 9 International Finance Statistics database of the International Monetary Fund.
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values of this indicator suggest a predominantly agrarian economy, which implies less well developed public institutions 10 .
The sample studied includes data from 33 countries 11 , over the observation period: 1995-2007, the panel is unbalanced. Table 3 presents a correlation matrix of coupled variables from the analysis. We can see from this table that the Ci-efficiency most strongly correlates with the proportion of imports in final consumption and the share of the banking sector assets in the GDP. These variables are also strongly correlated. The strongest correlation in the absolute value (-0.84) was observed between the proportion of agriculture in the GDP and the logarithm of per capita GDP. Equations (1) and (2) are evaluated on the basis of pooled data but in equation (2) two additional variables were included beyond those in equation (1): the proportion of banking sector assets in the GDP and the proportion of agriculture in the GDP. Evaluating the model with or without these variables is justified by their strong correlation (modulo of correlation coefficients is greater than 0.8) with the proportion of imports in final consumption with the log of the per capita GDP, respectively. Equations (3) and (4) The following conclusions may be drawn, based on evaluating the equations 12 :
1) The hypothesis of the equality to zero of the coefficients of the log of per capita GDP is rejected in three specifications out of four. In specification (4) this hypothesis is not rejected, perhaps, due to the strong co-linearity of the variable of per capita GDP and the proportion of agriculture in the GDP. Elimination of insignificant variables from (4) (corruption index, duration of VAT application, proportion of banking sector assets in the GDP) and the regression estimate 
shows that the hypothesis of equality to zero of the coefficient at the average value of the log of per capita GDP in specification (5) is rejected at the 10% level.
Thus, the coefficient is negative in the specifications of the pooled-regressions (significant at the 1% level) and positive in the specifications (3) (significant at the 5% level) and (5) (significant at the 10% level). Hence, only models with individual fixed effects favor the hypothesis of a positive effect of the level of economic development on the quality of VAT administration. Apparently, this may be explained 12 Results of assessments of these and other regression equations are presented in the Annex.
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by the fact that countries with a higher per capita GDP may have a lesser Ci-efficiency, not due to lower administration quality, but due to differences in the rates and the structure of the tax base. 
 . Analysis of cross-country variations in the Ci-efficiency, using the variation of the values of explanatory variables averaged over time, shows that the hypothesis of equality to zero of the coefficient at the average value of the log of per capita GDP is rejected. The coefficient is negative and significant at the 5% level. This means that in this sample the higher the average per capita GDP in one country compared to another country, the lower the Ci-efficiency. It can be concluded that each country has certain individual characteristics relating, apparently, to the differences in the determination of the tax base and the structure of preferential rates which are not taken into account in the regressions (1) and (2). These individual characteristics, fixed for each country, predetermine the difference in the Ci-efficiency indicator, so that crosscountry analysis shows a negative dependence, i.e. the higher the GDP, the lower the proportion of consumption which is subject to value-added tax.
Figure 3 presents a pair scatter diagram for Ci-efficiency regression residuals on all variables from regression (2), other than the log of per capita GDP, and the regression residuals of the log of per capita GDP on the remaining variables (for specification (2), i.e. for pool-regression). This helps to illustrate the effects on the Ci-efficiency, when cleared of the influence of all variables, other than the log of the per capita GDP, of the log of per capita GDP itself, the variation of which is cleared from variations in other According to a theoretical estimate based on the pooled regression, the unexplained part (residuals from the Ci-efficiency regression in the predictory factors) of the Ci-efficiency for Russia was the result of a positive and substantially high proportion of imports in final consumption, the corruption level, the VAT rate, the level of economic development, the VAT application period, the share of agriculture and the banking sector assets in GDP observed in [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . Thus, the level of the Ci-efficiency was constantly above its theoretical value. It follows herefrom that, within the framework of the model in question, the situation with VAT collection in Russia is not as well explained as in other countries. We can distinguish four reasons why there are cross-country and inter-temporal differences in the Ci-efficiency:
 differences in the fundamental indicators (the predictory variables of the model);
 differences in the methods of VAT assessment which were impossible to take into account using the predictory variables (in the model using individual effects, these differences are partially taken into account);
 differences in the efficiency of tax administration which were impossible to take into account using the predictory variables; 15  random errors.
As we consider the random errors to be small, the significant changes over time in the deviations of the actual Ci-efficiency value from the theoretical one for the RF (i.e. explained by the fundamental factors) may be explained by changes in the tax legislation, i.e. the methods of tax collection, or changes in the quality of administration not taken into account in the model, or to both.
If there is a reduction of the positive error occurring when the tax legislation remains unchanged, this could be interpreted as a reduction in the quality of tax administration (assuming the absence of any factor which was ignored but had initially improved the situation but later stopped working). Any significant changes in errors in the model may be matched to legislative changes, as the efficiency of tax administration is hardly likely to increase or decrease sharply. 2) The hypothesis of equality to zero of the coefficient for a variable "VAT rate" is rejected. The coefficient is negative and significant at the 1% level in all specifications, which favors the hypothesis that the value of the nominal tax rate negatively affects the Ci-efficiency.
3) The hypothesis of equality to zero of the coefficient of the ratio of imports to final consumption is rejected at the significance level of 1% in all specifications (the coefficient is positive). The results support the hypothesis that the higher the value of this ratio, the higher the tax revenues will be, all other conditions being equal.
4) The hypothesis of the equality to zero of the coefficient of the corruption index is rejected only in models without individual fixed effects, in which this coefficient is positive and significant at the level of 1%. Thus, the predictions of the model without individual effects, supports the hypothesis that there is positive influence on the Ci-efficiency by anti-corruption institutions (having a negative influence of the scale of the shadow economy). Perhaps, this is connected with the fact that the corruption index changes little over time for most countries and this is why its influence is eliminated with the introduction of individual effects into the regression, due to significant co-linearity with them. Indeed, as a result of evaluating equations (6) and (7), the hypothesis of equality to zero of the coefficient of corruption index averaged over time is rejected. The coefficient is positive and significant at the level of 1%. Thus, the influence of a 16 change in the corruption index on a change of Ci-efficiency is observed in the case of cross-country comparison, but is not observed in inter-temporal comparisons due to the shortness of the time interval.
5) The hypothesis of equality to zero of the coefficient for the duration of the period of VAT application is not rejected in all specifications, i.e. the hypothesis that there is no effect resulting from the influence of the experience and traditions of levying VAT on the quality of its administration is in agreement with the empirical data. Perhaps, this is explained by the general logic of the mechanisms of catchup development: those countries which implemented VAT later than others did not have to follow the whole path of improvement in its administration. The implementation of VAT in such countries constituted an adoption of ready-made systems from countries which had already developed (to a certain extent) relevant methods for its administration.
6) The hypothesis of equality to zero of the coefficient of the proportion of banking sector assets in GDP is not rejected in all specifications. At the same time, the Ci-efficiency correlation factor and the ratio of banking sector assets to GDP is 0.45. The insignificance of the influence of this variable may, perhaps, be explained by its large correlation with the ratio of the proportion of imports to final consumption (0.80). Indeed, the estimate of the initial models (1) and (3), in which the ratio of the proportion of imports to final consumption is replaced by the proportion of the banking sector assets in the GDP, i.e. the esti-
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shows that the hypothesis of equality to zero of the coefficient of the share of banking sector assets in GDP is rejected, unless the regression has an imports-to-final consumption ratio strongly correlated with this share. Such a result proves the hypothesis that the positive influence of the level of development of financial institutions (characterizing the general level of development of institutions in the country) on the quality of VAT administration dominates over the negative influence of the share of banking sector assets in the GDP which occurs because the majority of transactions are not subject to VAT in the financial sector, in general, and the banking sector, in particular. .
7) The hypothesis of equality to zero of the coefficient of the share of agriculture in the GDP is rejected in both model (2) and model (4). In specification (2) the coefficient is negative and significant at the level of 5%, in specification (4) it is negative and significant at the level of 1%. This proves the hypothesis of the negative link between the size of the agrarian sector and the quality of VAT administration.
Based on the econometric analysis carried out we can conclude that the actual data, in general, favors the formulated theoretical hypotheses with respect to the influence of various factors on the Ci-17 efficiency. The summary below contains substantive conclusive statements based on the results of the empirical estimates.
Conclusion
The main conclusion from the econometric analysis carried out is the existence of two mechanisms for the effects of the level of institutional development (which we approximate by the value of the true per capita GDP) on the quality of administration identified by using two different approaches: cross-country and inter-temporal analyses.
The cross-country analysis (based on regressions between countries) demonstrates a negative dependence of the Ci-efficiency on per capita GDP. If we assume a corresponding dependency in time and space for the relationships investigated (an approach based on pooled regressions), the dependence will also be negative. Such a result may be explained by the complexity of the VAT collection systems which accompany the development of individual countries. This leads to an increase in the number of tax deductions and tax rates and a corresponding reduction of the tax base and a worsening of its quality of admin-
istration.
An analysis of the dynamics of the variables over time ( This approach makes it possible to average the influence of the predictory variables (slope of regression)
over all countries and to forecast their short-term dynamics. In contrast, cross-country models makes it possible to draw some conclusions regarding long-term dependences. In such modeling it is assumed that the patterns analyzed are the same for countries with different levels of development. This is why, if we 18 predetermine the predictory values at the level of countries which are ahead of Russia in terms of development, we may forecast the efficiency of VAT administration until the point when the predetermined values of the predictory variables are be reached.
Taking into account the dynamics of Russian growth of real per capita GDP in PPP for [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] (from 7,832 to 13,911 USD, or 6.6% per year), it can be assumed that at such a rate Russia will reach the 2007 average GDP level of the OECD countries (about 32,663 USD) in15 years. If we consider a more conservative scenario of the real GDP growth (around 4% per year), the country will reach the 2007 average GDP level of the OECD countries in 20-25 years. Based on the above, in order to forecast changes in the effective tax base provided that the average OECD level is reached, it is expedient to use pooled models for characterizing the long-term dependences. (line 2). As a result, a possible Ci-efficiency value in Russia, provided that the average development level of the OECD countries is reached and that their structure of tax rates and tax base is adopted, will be 44.5-46.8% of final consumption, which is considerably lower than the actual 2007 level.
Thus, the estimates show that an increase in the efficiency of anti-corruption institutions will be the driver for increasing VAT revenues. This is why measures for the reduction of corruption and the share of the shadow sector in the Russian economy should be viewed as the priorities of the social and economic policy of the country which will, amongst other things, have significant tax effects.
Important steps in improving tax administration institutions and aimed at reducing corruption legislation are: increase in the neutrality and efficiency of VAT collection, in particular, harmonisation and simplification of the VAT refund procedure when using a zero rate, the introduction of voluntary registration of VAT taxpayers, licensing of taxpayers and applying special tax regimes to allow them to participate in VAT turnover, the creation of neutral procedure for VAT taxation in the case of transactions carried out for internal purposes, the formation of transparent tax legislation for VAT in e-commerce together with other measures.
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Along with the forecast resulting from the models, another scenario can be proposed, under which Russia, in catching up with the OECD countries in terms of the factors included in the model, will continue using the existing VAT system or even improve it by focusing on best-practice examples. In terms of the model this would mean the preservation of a positive error which, as we assume, is associated with the rational structure of the tax rates and relatively broad-based tax base (which is not fully reflected in the predictory variables) if the average OECD values of the model predictor factors are reached. In this case it is possible to forecast a considerably higher value of the Ci-efficiency indicator, which will reach not 44-47% of final consumption (line 3) but about 60% (line 4). If a negative influence of GDP growth and a rate increase are not taken into account in forecasting, the efficiency value may rise by 9.5-10.2 p.p., which corresponds to a final consumption level of 50.3-51.9% 15 .
In order to ensure that growth in the level of development of the country does not result in a Ciefficiency reduction in the long run, a range of measures to improve tax design, in addition to the above mentioned areas of improvement in tax administration should be taken, including elimination of the reduced rate and the limitation of the list of exemptions to those which are "standard" 16 for the OECD.
Thus, this analysis of the factors affecting the quality of VAT administration in Russia has allowed us to identify the positive effect of the level of institutional development on the efficiency of tax collection. However, this trend takes place only if simultaneous with economic development which results in an improvement in the performance of the institutions; there should be no additional tax deductions which, in addition to their direct costs, complicate the design of the tax system and would reduce its quality of administration.
ANNEX
Results of evaluations with models (1)-(9) of the efficiency of VAT collection 
Log of per capita GDP -0.0554*** (0 Source: authors' calculations. Standards errors are specified in brackets; ***, **, * -significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level; OLS -ordinary least squares; OLS, FE -ordinary least squares with fixed effects; OLS, BE -ordinary least squares in "between" regression.
